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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This appeal arises out of a Court-ordered mediation that was interrupted by a blatant 
violation of Idaho’s long-standing and well-known ethical rule that prohibits any attorney from 
having unauthorized contact with the opposing counsel’s client. Dinius’s secret, prohibited 
contact with the opposing party Kosmann resulted in immediate damage to Kosmann: he was 
tricked into reducing his existing $40,000 settlement to $32,000. When Messerly, Kosmann’s 
attorney, learned of the unauthorized, ex parte negotiations, he immediately demanded that the 
violation be remedied by the painless resolution of returning to the original $40,000 settlement 
that had been agreed upon after hours of mediation. Instead, the mediator Judge Dunn, opposing 
counsel Dunbar, and Dinius all unashamedly insisted that the secret, ex-parte communications 
were valid and the reduced settlement was the only enforceable agreement. They misled 
Kosmann (about the ethical violation and the need for the counsel release) and threatened him 
(with sanctions and more litigation) into ignoring his counsel’s objections and capitulating to 
place the reduced settlement on the record.  
Fortunately, Messerly put an objection on the record that made clear what had happened 
and caused Judge Dunn, Dinius, and Dunbar to admit on the record that they had secret, ex parte 
negotiations with the opposing counsel’s client, which resulted in the settlement being reduced 
from $40,000 to $32,000. This is not a “he said, she said” debate about the key elements of what 
happened during mediation. Here, Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn all readily admitted (on the 
record and in their subsequent affidavits) their role and participation in violating IRPC 4.2.     
Thereafter, Messerly convinced Kosmann that what happened was unethical, unjust, and 
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dishonest and needed to be challenged (regardless of the difficulty of challenging the ethical 
violations of a sitting District Judge and two attorneys). Kosmann merely insisted he be paid his 
full $40,000 settlement as originally agreed upon. Instead, Dinius asked the District Court to 
approve the reduced $32,000 settlement amount that he renegotiated behind Messerly’s back. 
The District Court used its best mental gymnastics to avoid recognizing the ethical violation. In 
order to reach the result it wanted, the District Court treated this litigation like a run-of-the-mill 
contract dispute about a settlement agreement, rather than as an ethics violation and equitable 
remedy case. The District Court even ruled it did not matter whether an ethics violation occurred.  
Imagine, during a formal, court-ordered mediation, you (the attorney) reach a final 
resolution for your client after six long hours of extremely intense negotiations, your client 
leaves the room for a few minutes and you later learn that the supposedly neutral mediator (a 
sitting Judge) set up a meeting (telling everyone except you) for your client to secretly negotiate 
directly with the opposing client, who happens to be a notoriously disreputable attorney, and that 
opposing attorney-party uses that secret meeting to bad mouth you, give legal advice to your 
client, and then convince your client to reduce the settlement that you had already reached. This 
was a flagrant violation of one of the most foundational rules of American litigation.  
This appeal asks the Court to recognize that this is an ethics law case, that the District 
Court committed legal error and abused its discretion in ignoring the central, material ethics 
violation and rewarding rather than remedying the blatant violation, and that the proper 
resolution of the violation is straightforward under ethics law, equity and common sense – make 
Kosmann whole both as to his full settlement amount (the missing $8,000) and as to his attorney 
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fees incurred and impose whatever additional sanction against Dinius and Dunbar that is 
reasonable considering the many aggravating factors in this case. In addition, the retaliatory 
sanctions improperly requested by Dinius and Dunbar and imposed by the District Court against 
Kosmann/Messerly should be rescinded and refunded, with Dinius paying the fees incurred by 
Kosmann to defend against the frivolous Rule 11 sanction requests from Diniuis.   
II. ARGUMENT 
 
A. The District Court and Dinius and Dunbar Take Positions Contrary to Idaho Law and 
That Would Greatly Damage Idaho Law; Kosmann Applies Existing, Uniform Law. 
This case is remarkable in many, many ways: (1) a District Judge, acting as a mediator, 
admitted on the record to orchestrating a secret meeting between an attorney and the opposing 
party, without telling the opposing party’s counsel (7/26/17 Tr. P.2 L.16-21; P.10 L.10-16); (2) 
the District Judge also stated on the record that he believed there was nothing wrong with 
facilitating this secret meeting behind Messerly’s back (Id., P.10 L.14-16: “I allowed them to do 
that because clients can meet if they wish.”); (3) Dinius and Dunbar somehow thought Dinius 
could meet alone with Kosmann during the mediation, without asking anyone (e.g., Kosmann, 
Judge Dunn, or Messerly) if Messerly had authorized the ex parte meeting (Respondent’s Brief 
(“RB”), p.15-16); (4) after learning during the mediation that they had “accidentally” met with 
Messerly’s client without authorization, neither Dunbar or Dinius would apologize or fix what 
they had done and they have repeatedly refused to fix it during more than a year of litigation; (5) 
when provided the opportunity to avoid litigation about their ethical mistake and instead only 
pay the $8,000 that the malpractice insurer had already promised to pay (R. Vol. 3, p. 315, ¶26-
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27, p.415-416, ¶24, & p.423.), Dinius and Dunbar refused and choose instead to unapologetically 
argue that they did nothing wrong by secretly negotiating with an opposing attorney’s client; (6) 
when presented with the Runsvold case that rejected their main legal argument that Dinius was 
merely a “party” (not an attorney) and did nothing wrong, instead of admitting their mistake and 
fixing the problem, Dinius and Dunbar just pivoted to a new legal argument of arguing a new 
loophole to “distinguish” the Runsvold case; (7) a District Judge ruled that he lacked authority to 
stop, sanction, or remedy attorney ethical violations occurring in and prejudicing his case (R. 
Vol. 2, pp. 170-71); (8) a District Judge repeatedly ruled that it did not matter that an attorney 
secretly met with the opposing counsel’s client to reduce that client’s existing settlement (R. Vol. 
2, pp. 193-94); (9) a District Judge ruled that retaliatory Rule 11 sanctions would be imposed 
solely because a lawyer accidentally and temporarily forgot to file a motion for leave (Id., 
pp.173-74); (10) a District Judge ruled that an attorney secretly meeting with the opposing 
attorney’s client would not be punished but forgetting to file a motion for leave would be 
sanctioned; (11) a District Judge ignored the undisputed fact that Rule 11’s 21-day safe-harbor 
requirement was violated (R. Vol. 2, pp.194-95); (12) Dinius and Dunbar knew that they did not 
comply with Rule 11’s 21-day notice requirement, yet they still sought and continue to seek 
sanctions, in direct violation of that requirement; (13) a District Judge gave his judicial blessing 
to reward an ethical violation by enforcing reduced terms that were only obtained through the 
ethical violation (R. Vol. 2, pp. 190-92); (14) Dinius and Dunbar threatened Kosmann during the 
mediation that if he challenged their ethical violation then they would run up his litigation costs 
and seek sanctions against him, and they have repeatedly made good on that threat, with 
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF -- 5 
impunity; and (15) two experienced Idaho attorneys think so little of the ethical rules that they 
choose to argue that secretly negotiating with an opposing counsel’s client is not prohibited, 
rather than have their insurer pay the $8,000 as agreed upon. Truth is truly stranger than fiction.1 
Respondent’s position on appeal is a continuation of the absurd things that have occurred 
in this litigation. The Respondent’s Brief argued that this Court should rubber stamp everything 
done by the District Court and thereby create new Idaho law in a number of areas, including the 
following highly problematic legal and factual conclusions: (1) a District Judge has no authority 
to enforce the ethical rule violations that affect his case and cannot remedy any damages caused 
in his case (RB, pp.31-33); (2) an attorney-party has a loophole around the Runsvold decision 
and IRPC 4.2 to violate the no-contact rule by speaking secretly with the opposing party, as long 
as the attorney-party has hired an attorney of record (RB, pp.28-30); (3) an attorney-party can 
violate IRCP 4.2 and get away with it as long as they are able to threaten and manipulate the 
opposing party into temporarily not following his attorney’s advice; (4) a District Judge does not 
abuse its discretion by ignoring a crucial, admitted ethical violation that directly resulted in a 
unfair, renegotiated settlement agreement; (5) a District Judge does not abuse its discretion by 
                                                 
1 That 15-point list could be significantly longer. Dinius also argued: that a declaration should be 
stricken because it was signed with an electronic signature rather than a hand-written signature 
(R. Vol. 3, p.431); that portions of a declaration should be stricken because they used the terms 
“secret” and “ex parte” to describe the meeting that occurred behind Messerly’s back (Id., p. 
437-38); that the secret, ex parte meeting was “court ordered” within the meaning of IRPC 4.2 
because the mediator helped set it up (Id., p. 266); that every reply brief from Messerly was 
improper when it cited to new case law, even though those cases directly responded to arguments 
raised by Dinius in opposition briefs; that motions to reconsider cannot include new legal 
theories (Id., p. 461); that this Court did not issue the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (Id., 
p. 462); and that Kosmann’s attempt to enforce IRPC 4.2 was so contrary to law that it merited 
Rule 11 sanctions (Id., pp. 279-87). Those arguments were also frivolous.  
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giving its judicial blessing to a settlement agreement that was obtained through an attorney 
ethical violation; (6) no Idaho attorney can allow his client to be alone with a mediator and/or 
District Judge because if he does, then he is impliedly allowing his client to also meet alone with 
the opposing party and/or attorney (RB, p.30); (7) a violation of IRPC 4.2 is ignored and the 
resulting settlement is legally enforced as long as the violating attorneys claim they had good 
reason to assume (incorrectly) that the opposing party had authorized the ex parte negotiations; 
(8) a violation of IRPC 4.2 is ignored as long as the mediator improperly facilitated the secret, ex 
parte communication (RB, p.30); (9) a District Court can ignore/distinguish existing Supreme 
Court precedent (Runsvold) as long as the District Court can find any factual difference, and the 
District Court does not have to articulate why that factual difference is material (RB, p.26); (10) 
a Court can find that a settlement is knowing and voluntary, without even addressing the sworn 
declarations and other evidence in the record showing that the settlement was a product of ethical 
violations, leveraging of the improper advantages gained by violation of the no-contact rule, 
deception of a layperson by a District Judge and two attorneys, and improper threats of litigation 
costs and sanctions; (11) an attorney who violates an ethical rule can force the other party to 
litigate to prove the ethical violation and can avoid reimbursing all of those attorney fees; (12) a 
District Court does not abuse its discretion by claiming that it will not enforce the ethical rules 
impacting its case because it would rather delegate the issue entirely to the Idaho State Bar; (13) 
Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed for any trivial, procedural error by an attorney; (14) Rule 11 
sanctions can be imposed even if the 21-day notice requirement in Rule 11 was not followed and 
even if the procedural error was fixed within two days; (15) Rule 11 sanctions can be requested 
 
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF -- 7 
for retaliatory, obstructionist, frivolous, and other improper reasons, again without any 
consequences; (15) attorneys can request Rule 11 sanctions, despite knowing that they have not 
complied with the 21-day notice requirement and thus knowing they are legally prohibited from 
seeking sanctions, again with no consequences; (16) it is not an abuse of discretion for the court 
to ignore all or almost all of the arguments made by one side, declining to even explain how they 
are wrong; (17) it is not an abuse of discretion for the court to strike an entire memorandum and 
declaration merely because there was reasonable confusion about the briefing deadlines, despite 
no prejudice being shown and lesser, non-prejudicial remedies being available. It is remarkable 
that Dinius and Dunbar would make any of the above, nonsensical and legally incorrect 
arguments; here, they explicitly make all of them. None of them are supported by common sense 
or Idaho law and it would be highly problematic if even one of them became Idaho law.  
In contrast, Kosmann merely asks this Court (as it asked the District Court below) to 
enforce existing Idaho and/or black letter law, as follows: IRCP 4.2 and Runsvold hold that an 
attorney-party cannot have secret, ex parte meetings with the opposing party without explicitly 
requesting and receiving authorization from opposing counsel (Appellant’s Opening Brief 
(“AOB”), Part III.B); Idaho case law and common sense holds that courts have inherent authority 
to enforce court rules, which would include enforcing attorney ethical rules issued by this Court; 
black letter law across jurisdictions holds that Courts should remedy ethical violations that 
impact their cases, using common sense solutions; black letter law holds that parties are not 
allowed to profit from ethical violations; black letter law holds that violations of the no-contact 
rule are remedied by unwinding the damage done from the improper contact, which in this case 
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would mean voiding the result of prohibited and manipulative communications that reduced 
Kosmann’s settlement amount from $40,000 to $32,000 (i.e. awarding Kosmann the $8,000 
taken from him) and reimbursing all attorney fees incurred in order to litigate regarding the 
violation; Rule 11’s official notes state that retaliatory and frivolous Rule 11 sanctions requests, 
that clearly do not comply with the requirements of Rule 11 or its interpretive case law, are 
improper and should result in fee awards against the party requesting the sanctions. Such a 
straightforward resolution is supported by public policy, incentivizes ethical behavior, 
incentivizes voluntary corrections of unethical actions, and is consistent with existing Idaho law 
and related black letter ethics law. 
B. The Undisputed Facts Are the Key Facts That Support Reversal of the District Court.  
The Respondent’s Brief is important in pointing out that Dinius cannot challenge the key 
facts of what occurred during the mediation at issue. Dinius claims that there is disagreement 
about what occurred during the mediation. However, that disagreement is about facts that do not 
need to be resolved in order to recognize the ethical violation and impose the proper remedy. A 
close review of the Respondent’s Brief (and its silence regarding the many undisputed facts) and 
the declarations in the record from Dinius and Dunbar show that Dinius cannot dispute the key 
facts that should have been dispositive in the litigation before the District Court: 
 The mediation was to settle (1) Dinius’s claim to more fees from the Gilbride litigation, 
(2) Kosmann’s claim of Dinius’s malpractice in the Gilbride litigation, and (3) 
Kosmann’s attempt to get the Court to release his $32,000 from the Gilbride litigation.   
 After numerous hours of negotiations between the parties, both represented by counsel, 
they reached an agreement that in exchange for mutual releases of all claims, Kosmann 
would get back his $32,000, plus he would receive an additional $8,000 from Dinius’s 
malpractice insurer, and Dinius would receive an undisclosed amount (later disclosed as 
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$15,000) from Dinius’s malpractice insurer (though this payment would be routed to 
Dinius through Kosmann, as required by the insurer);  
 The parties then had a disagreement about the scope of the mutual release, with Kosmann 
wanting the release from Dinius to also release Kosmann’s counsel Messerly (the 
“Messerly release”) and Dinius refusing to include Messerly; 
 Kosmann wanted the Messerly release because Dinius had twice threatened to sue 
Messerly, and Kosmann did not want his counsel sued frivolously as retaliation; 
 The dispute about the Messerly release was about whether it was ethical, and the parties 
did not discuss Kosmann paying anything for this Messerly release; rather the Messerly 
release was discussed at the end of the mediation, after the settlement amounts had 
already been approved by the parties and malpractice insurer; 
 Dinius claimed he could not agree to include Messerly in the release because it would be 
an ethics violation, and Judge Dunn agreed, even threatening Messerly (in front of 
Kosmann) that he may have to report this request to the State Bar; 
 Messerly ultimately counseled Kosmann to drop the issue of the Messerly release, and 
Messerly told Kosmann he would not accept the release because Bar Counsel had 
indicated it could be ethically suspect; 
 Kosmann told the mediator the release was dropped and the case was settled for $40,000; 
 Kosmann asked Judge Dunn to let him talk to Dinius about not suing Messerly; 
 Messerly was unaware that Kosmann made this request and would not have authorized 
this ex parte meeting had he known about it; 
 Judge Dunn did not notify Messerly of Kosmann’s request to meet with Dinius; 
 Judge Dunn asked Dinius and Dunbar to have Dinius meet alone with Kosmann to “clear 
the air” and discuss the issue of the Messerly release; 
 Dinius and Dunbar did not ask Kosmann or Judge Dunn if Messerly had agreed to this ex 
parte meeting; 
 Dinius and Dunbar did not ask Messerly if he would agree to the ex parte meeting;  
 Instead, Dinius and Dunbar claim they assumed Messerly was okay with the ex parte 
meeting because it was being requested by Kosmann and the mediator; 
 Dinius, with Dunbar and Judge Dunn’s consent, had the ex parte meeting with Kosmann; 
 During the meeting, Dinius discussed including a release of any claims against Messerly 
in exchange for Kosmann receiving only the return of his $32,000, i.e., Kosmann would 
reduce his settlement by $8,000 in order to pay for Messerly’s release;  
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 This reduced settlement offer from Dinius to Kosmann had never been made during the 
hours of negotiations through Kosmann’s attorney, i.e. when Messerly was no longer 
around to protect Kosmann, Dinius changed his position and said he would include the 
counsel release, but only if Kosmann would pay for it; 
 Dinius’s offer during the ex parte meeting was the first time in approximately two hours 
of debate over the Messerly release that Dinius admitted the Messerly release could be 
included without violating any ethics, i.e. when Messerly was no longer around to protect 
Kosmann, Dinius flipped his position to agree with Messerly that the release was not 
unethical, thereby using the release dispute (and Kosmann’s naivete about it) to obtain a 
financial benefit for Dinius;  
 Similarly, once Dinius reached this new agreement with Kosmann, Judge Dunn also 
immediately flipped his position and claimed the release for Messerly was not unethical, 
even though Kosmann was now paying for the release for his counsel (which actually did 
create a significant potential conflict); 
 Dinius has not alleged that he had any direct claim against Messerly that he released but 
instead he claims he had some potential derivative defense against Messerly that he 
released, i.e. if Kosmann lost his lawsuit against his realtor McCarthy based on a statute 
of limitation defense and then Kosmann sued Messerly for malpractice in not suing 
McCarthy sooner, and then Messerly tried to cross-sue Dinius for contribution for also 
not suing McCarthy sooner, then Dinius was somehow releasing his “defense” to 
Messerly’s theoretical contribution claim (at least that is the best Messerly can make of 
what Dinius was promising to Kosmann that he would release as against Messerly); 
 When Messerly learned of the new terms that Dinius and Judge Dunn were claiming, he 
immediately objected and said this was improper, the case had already been settled for 
better terms for his client, and he had already said he would not accept any release and 
certainly would not let his client pay for it; 
 Messerly put these facts on the record: that there was a $40,000 settlement that had been 
reduced to $32,000 through secret, ex parte communications by Dinius with his client 
that he would never have allowed to happen had he known about it, and he had already 
renounced the consideration that Dinius claimed he was giving to Kosmann, 
consideration that Dinius had previously claimed was unethical, so Kosmann had been 
tricked into giving up $8,000 in exchange for nothing; 
 Dinius and Dunbar and Judge Dunn all admitted on the record that the ex parte 
communications with Kosmann happened and that the communications resulted in a 
$40,000 settlement being reduced to $32,000;   
 Judge Dunn said on the record that the ex parte communications happened purposely and 
that he orchestrated them because parties can “always” speak without their attorneys and 
the attorneys do not have to authorize it (Judge Dunn talked with Dinius’s attorney but 
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not with Kosmann’s attorney about having the meeting); Dinius and Dunbar said on the 
record that the ex parte communications were an accident because they thought Messerly 
knew about the communications; 
 Kosmann said on the record that he was not doing what his attorney advised but needed 
the litigation to be over; 
 Kosmann further explained in his filed declarations that he went against his attorney and 
put the lesser settlement on the record because he was being threatened with more 
litigation and possible sanctions if he did not go along with what Judge Dunn, Dunbar, 
and Dinius were claiming about the ex parte meeting not being a violation and the 
reduced settlement being enforceable.  
(AOB, Part I.B.1-8; RB, Part II.) 
C. The Appropriate Non-Judicial or Judicial Resolution of These Undisputed Facts Should 
Have Been Easy.  
These facts do not create a challenging legal question. To the contrary, the resolution 
should have been extremely simple. The concept that attorneys do not get to go behind the back 
of opposing counsel (even if “accidental”) in order to negotiate a more advantageous settlement 
with a naïve, layperson is the classic “no brainer” in the law. It is a concept entrenched in law 
since at least the 1908. (AOB, p.29, fn.2.) The “no-contact rule” has been described as a bedrock 
principle that ensures the proper functioning of our adversary legal system. (Id.) Similarly, the 
concept that attorneys should not profit from their ethical violations is black letter law. See Boe 
v. Boe, 163 Idaho 922, 422 P.3d 1128, 1140 (2018) (“Hopper reflects the cornerstone maxim of 
our justice system that a party cannot reap a profit by virtue of committing misconduct. See, e.g., 
30A C.J.S. Equity § 110 (2018).”). This case shows exactly what happens to our legal system 
when these principles are breached (and when a District Judge refuses to acknowledge and 
enforce these bedrock principles of equity and justice). 
Here, it is undisputed that the parties had mediated a global settlement resolution and 
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then one unexpected and minor issue arose that they were debating: would Dinius agree that his 
release would also include a release of Messerly and was there anything unethical about such a 
release of counsel. Dinius claimed he would not give the release because it was unethical to 
include such a release, and Kosmann claimed it was not unethical and would protect his attorney 
from future retaliatory lawsuits. Messerly ultimately decided that the dispute about whether the 
release was ethical meant he would not accept the release even if offered, and so he sent 
Kosmann to the mediator to confirm there was no longer any dispute on any issue, i.e. the 
settlement was final. After relaying that message, Kosmann then naively asked if he could speak 
with his ex-attorney Dinius about this release of counsel (because he was worried Dinius was 
going to try to sue his friend Messerly as retaliation for the malpractice lawsuit against Dinius). 
Such an error in judgment by Kosmann is why the no contact rule is in place, as it “prevents a 
lawyer from nullifying the protection a represented person has achieved by retaining counsel.” 
Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 421, 925 P.2d 1118, 1120 (1996) (quoting G. 
HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, § 4.2.101 (2d ed. 1993)); see also 
IRPC 4.2, cmt. 3 (“The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or 
consents to the communication.”) (emphasis added). 
The law is clear about what Judge Dunn, Dinius, and Dunbar (three attorneys) were 
required to do in this situation. If they wanted to have the ex parte meeting, then they needed to 
come to Messerly, sitting a few feet away behind a closed door, and ask him whether he would 
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consent to this ex parte meeting between Kosmann and Dinius.2 Of course, Messerly would not 
have allowed it had he been asked (for numerous reasons, including that the case was already 
settled, Dinius’s poor reputation in the community, the numerous improper things that Dinius 
and Dunbar had already done during the litigation and during the mediation, Kosmann’s naivety 
in litigation, and Dinius’s extra advantage as Kosmann’s prior attorney). (7/26/17 Tr. P.6 L.25- 
P.7 L.3: “I have grave concern about this because I wasn’t there and I would never have allowed 
[it].”). Thus, it should be undisputed that but for the ethics violation, the mediation would have 
ended with the $40,000 settlement and no Messerly release, which was agreeable to both sides. 
(Id., P.5, L.19-25: “And I told my client, take the $40,000 and don’t put me on the release. … So 
I said take that deal. I sent him out of the room to go take that deal ….”).  
Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn, however, did not ask Messerly for permission. Instead, 
for various reasons (Judge Dunn claimed they were just parties so he did not have to get 
Messerly’s permission; Dinius and Dunbar claim they just assumed Messerly was okay with it), 
they took zero actions to confirm whether Messerly had consented to such a meeting, i.e. they 
did not ask Messerly whether he consented and no one told them Messerly had consented.  
The result was predictable for any situation where a savvy and infamous attorney is 
                                                 
2 Most attorneys would not even ask opposing counsel for permission to have an ex parte 
communication with the opposing party, knowing that no responsible attorney would allow such 
a meeting between an attorney and an unsophisticated client. Ethical attorneys would be 
uncomfortable having even non-substantive conversations with the other party without their 
counsel present. See Fucile, Mark, ADVOCATE, Making Contact: The “No Contact With 
Represented Parties" Rule, June 2006 (“Potential sanctions for unauthorized contact can include 
disqualification, suppression of the evidence obtained and bar discipline. Given those possible 
sanctions coupled with the natural reaction of opposing counsel who learns of a perceived ‘end 
run’ to get to his or her client, this is definitely an area where it’s better to be safe than sorry.”). 
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meeting alone with an ex-client (a layperson with no business or legal experience). In this secret 
meeting, Dinius flipped his position regarding the release for Messerly, now claiming that the 
release could be ethically provided. Dinius then made an offer to Kosmann that he had never 
made during the time that Kosmann had Messerly’s legal protection: Dinius would give the 
release in exchange for Kosmann dropping his settlement payment by $8,000. Further, he gave 
Kosmann legal advice about Messerly’s potential liability (falsely claiming Messerly committed 
malpractice and had harmed Kosmann by taking over Kosmann’s representation from Dinius) 
and about the waiver of an alleged conflict of interest, and he used his prior attorney-client 
relationship with Kosmann to manipulate Kosmann into paying $8,000 for a release that was not 
even directly for Kosmann. All of this was way out of bounds ethically and resulted in 
immediate harm to Kosmann. 
So, again, the legal resolution of this scenario should have been easy for both Dinius and 
Dunbar and for the District Judge. Once Dinius and Dunbar realized their “mistake”, they had 
every opportunity to resolve the situation voluntarily by going forward with the settlement that 
everyone had already agreed upon: $40,000 to Kosmann and no Messerly release.3 Once Dinius 
and Dunbar refused to do the ethical and obvious thing to resolve the situation without any 
further litigation, then the District Judge had just as easy a resolution: recognize the ethical 
                                                 
3 This Court has stated that the cost of litigation, and particularly unnecessary litigation, is 
concerning. Here, the parties knew there was an ethical violation and it had the simplest and 
cheapest resolution: proceed with the settlement the parties had already agreed upon, a difference 
of only $8,000. Kosmann repeatedly made that offer, to avoid litigation. Yet, inexplicably, 
Dinius and Dunbar forced the parties to litigate for well over a year. This approach was highly 
beneficial to Dunbar, who undoubtedly earned significant fees for taking this litigious approach.  
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violation and remedy it by enforcing the original $40,000 settlement and ordering attorney fees 
against Dinius and Dunbar for refusing to admit their “mistake” and instead pursuing 
unnecessary litigation. Justice, common sense, and decades of legal precedents regarding the no-
contact rule and enforcing ethical rules would have supported such an easy resolution.   
Instead, for reasons that are still unclear,4 the District Judge refused to implement that 
simple remedy. Dinius and Dunbar filed numerous briefs and declarations admitting that they 
had this secret, ex parte negotiation with Kosmann that reduced the settlement that Kosmann’s 
counsel had negotiated, but they argued that this was totally permissible and they had done 
nothing wrong. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 19-59, 190-97, 198-202, 238-46, 249-53.) Not only that, they 
repeatedly filed briefs seeking retaliatory sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly for baseless 
reasons. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 187-89; pp. 206-07; pp. 268-69; pp. 277-87; pp. 327-32; pp. 463-64.) 
The District Judge went along with Dinius and Dunbar in every respect: he repeatedly 
ruled that he (1) would not decide whether there was a violation of the no-contact rule, (2) would 
do nothing about it even if there was a violation, (3) would enforce the better settlement that 
Dinius and Dunbar obtained by going behind Messerly’s back, manipulating and deceiving 
Kosmann, and then threatening Kosmann, and (4) would impose the retaliatory sanction against 
Kosmann under Rule 11. In order to reach the result it wanted, the District Court issued written 
rulings that superficially and incorrectly addressed a few legal issues and did not address the vast 
                                                 
4 A cynical interpretation of the result in this case would be that Judge Dunn acted in an 
improper and biased way during the mediation in order to protect his fellow lawyers and help 
them get a better resolution of their malpractice case, and the District Court ignored the law in 
this case and retaliated with sanctions against Kosmann and Messerly as an attempt to protect a 
fellow District Judge and two fellow attorneys from having their unethical actions exposed.  
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majority of the overwhelming legal citations and arguments provided by Kosmann in this case. 
This appeal is a request that the Court right this wrong, first reversing all three of the key, 
unsupportable rulings of the District Judge, and then remanding with instructions that implement 
the simple remedy that was requested from the start and that should not have required years of 
litigation: recognize the blatant ethical violation and implement the logical remedy by 
reimbursing Kosmann (1) the lost $8,000 and (2) all of his attorney fees in having to litigate 
these issues before the District Court and through the end of this appeal, including fees related to 
all of Dinius’s improper sanctions requests. If the Court so chooses, it could go further and order 
that on remand the District Judge should further sanction Dinius and Dunbar for all the 
aggravating factors in this case and/or should disgorge any fees Dunbar has earned in forcing the 
parties to have to litigate about a clear ethical violation, in which she was an active participant. 
See IRPC 8.4 (“knowingly assist”).                    
D. Dinius and Dunbar Falsely Allege Kosmann Has Not Challenged All Relevant Rulings 
of the District Court. 
The facts and the law do not support any of Dinius and Dunbar’s many and varied 
substantive positions in this case. As pointed out to the District Court and as continues in this 
appeal, Dinius cannot cite any case law to support their substantive arguments. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 
502-03). Instead, their Respondent Brief is mostly false claims about the record and about 
procedure, apparently hoping that this Court will allow them to get away with everything based 
upon some procedural technicality (as they were able to get the District Court to do). Their 
claims about the record below are false and not cited.  
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 Dinius falsely claims that Kosmann’s Appellant Brief did not challenge all of the relevant 
conclusions of the District Court in this case. The District Court issued three memorandum 
decisions (November 2 and November 22, 2017, and January 24, 2018) that all merit reversal. 
The Appellant Opening Brief points out how the District Court’s rulings were incorrect, ignored 
the law, ignored the correct arguments raised by Kosmann, kept changing the reasoning in order 
to get to the predetermined result, made numerous errors of law, and consistently abused its 
discretion. To avoid duplication, the Appellant Brief argument section did not address each 
memorandum ruling separately but instead focused on the key, incorrect substantive holdings of 
the District Court (which spanned multiple memorandum decisions).5  
                                                 
5 The sheer volume of errors by the District Judge in this case did pose a significant challenge in 
addressing them all within the fifty page limit of the Appellant Opening Brief: applying 
irrelevant contract law to ignore an ethics violation; allowing an attorney-party to financially 
benefit from his ethics violation; improperly distinguishing a key precedent; ignoring all 
arguments for why the precedent could not be distinguished; refusing to consider all of the 
aggravating factors regarding the ethical violation in this case; ignoring all arguments for why 
ethics law and not contract law should be applied; citing the summary judgment standard for 
enforcement of settlement agreement but then ignoring all disputed facts regarding the 
voluntariness of the reduced settlement; claiming the district court lacked authority to enforce 
ethics violations affecting their cases; claiming it could make the discretionary decision to ignore 
an ethics violation that directly impacted the settlement terms in the case and benefited the party 
violating the rules; claiming that it should defer to the Idaho State Bar’s disciplinary powers 
rather than enforce the attorney ethics rules in its cases; failing to explain why having an attorney 
of record would allow an attorney-party to reasonably believe they could violate the no-contact 
rule; claiming that Idaho law is unclear on whether an attorney-party can secretly negotiate with 
the opposing party; claiming that ethics rules should not be enforced by the District Court if Rule 
11 (which deals with briefing arguments not violating the no-contact rule) is not implicated; 
citing to no-contact cases from other jurisdictions that had already been rejected in the Runsvold 
case; imposing no sanctions for a violation of the no contact rule but imposing sanctions for 
briefly forgetting to file a motion for leave; citing the abuse of discretion standard for imposing 
Rule 11 sanctions but citing none of the other ample case law surrounding Rule 11; ignoring all 
of the Rule 11 case law cited by Kosmann; ignoring the safe-harbor provision in Rule 11 and 
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1. The Rule 4.2 Violation and the Runsvold Case Require Reversal of All District 
Court Rulings. 
In all three of its memorandum decisions, the District Court reviewed the ethics violation, 
including Rule 4.2 and the Runsvold case, and claimed that an attorney secretly negotiating with 
the opposing attorney’s client was not a significant cause for concern, was debatable whether it 
was a violation, and/or was not an issue for it to resolve. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 149-53, 166-71, 192.) 
That error of law is the root of all the injustice and incorrect rulings in this case and should lead 
to a reversal of all the District Court’s rulings.  
A violation of Rule 4.2 cannot just be ignored. This Court, in adopting these ethical rules 
and their official comments, has already stated that this ethical rule is crucial:  
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a 
person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible 
overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by 
those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of 
information relating to the representation.  
IRPC 4.2, cmt. 1. The rule is so important that the law has built up numerous protections against 
erosions of the rule. For example, attorneys: cannot get around it by relying upon the layperson’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
imposing sanctions without any showing of compliance with that provision; sanctioning an 
attorney for a trivial procedural mistake that caused no damage and was fixed well-within the 
safe-harbor timeframe; refusing to sanction a party for using Rule 11 for retaliatory and other 
improper purposes; sanctioning one party for a trivial procedural mistake while helping the other 
party to fix its own procedural mistake that it made in asking for those sanctions; citing the abuse 
of discretion standard for deciding whether to strike an untimely pleading but then not discussing 
any relevant issues like prejudice or lesser, non-substantive sanctions; failing to explain whether 
striking the brief and declarations had any substantive significance; and ignoring all arguments 
by Kosmann regarding why the brief and declaration should not be stricken.  
Literally every conclusion of law by the District Court was an error of law and/or an 
abuse of discretion and often for multiple, independent reasons. Hence the unusual request that 
on remand this case be sent to a different District Judge, which this Court has ordered in other 
cases involving shocking and inexplicable rulings. 
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consent, have to expressly ask for consent from the opposing attorney, cannot claim that consent 
was assumed or implied, and cannot avoid a violation by claiming ignorance or mistake.   
Similarly, this Court’s logical interpretation of Rule 4.2 in Runsvold is not properly 
distinguishable, ignored, or marginalized. This Court long ago (1996) ruled that attorney-parties 
are not allowed to have secret meetings with the opposing attorney’s client, and this Court gave 
detailed policy reasons for this interpretation of Rule 4.2 (which did not even mention the 
important fact that attorney-parties are much more motivated to violate the no-contact rule in 
order to manipulate the opposing party, because it benefits them personally as the client). That 
ruling has stood the test of time and has been adopted by most or all other jurisdictions. 
In three separate opinions addressing Runsvold (R. Vol. 3, pp. 149-53, 166-71, 192), the 
District Court failed to give a reasoned explanation for why Runsvold’s holding and policy bases 
would not apply in this case, nor did it respond to any of Kosmann’s many reasoned arguments 
for why Runsvold is controlling (R. Vol. 3, pp. 221-23, 383-89). In particular, the District Court 
had no answer for why this Court would approve of a loophole to allow an attorney-party to 
violate the no-contact rule as long as the attorney-party put another attorney on the pleadings. It 
is an error of law to ignore or marginalize the Rule 4.2 violation and an error of law to 
distinguish applicable precedent without providing a reasoned explanation.  
Had the District Court correctly recognized the significance of this blatant ethics 
violation, including the various important policy objectives that were undermined, then the 
Court’s three rulings certainly should have been different and should be overturned. For 
example, had the District Court correctly recognized the significance of this ethics violation, it 
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would not have claimed the violation should be dealt with only by the Idaho State Bar, thus using 
the Court’s authority to approve and validate the tainted result from the violation, helping Dinius 
reap the financial benefits of his ethics violation, and leaving the naïve layperson damaged by the 
violation. See Boe, 163 Idaho 922, 422 P.3d at 1140 (“cornerstone maxim of our justice system 
that a party cannot reap a profit by virtue of committing misconduct”). 
Had the District Court correctly recognized the significance of this ethics violation, it 
would not have concluded the violation was irrelevant merely because Kosmann temporarily 
decided to just give in to what had happened, against the wishes of his own attorney. Instead, the 
District Court would have recognized that Kosmann’s temporary actions in putting the lesser 
settlement on the record were not willful and voluntary in any ordinary sense:  
 during the ex parte meeting, Kosmann was manipulated by his ex-attorney into believing 
that he needed to pay for this counsel release;  
 during the ex parte meeting, Dinius bad mouthed Messerly and claimed malpractice, 
causing Kosmann to doubt Messerly’s counsel;  
 Kosmann was trusting his ex-attorney Dinius’s claims about Messerly needing a release 
and Dinius’s “graciousness” in offering it;  
 Kosmann was blaming himself for asking for the meeting and then being tricked by 
Dinius into agreeing to something less;  
 Kosmann is not a lawyer and did not understand Rule 4.2 or the obligations on Dinius;  
 Kosmann was manipulated by Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn into believing that he was 
going to lose any litigation about the violation of the no-contact rule and any litigation 
over the two different settlements;  
 Kosmann was manipulated by Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn into believing that he was 
going to be sanctioned if he did not go along with the new settlement that he knew he had 
been involved in reaching;  
 Kosmann was justifiably worried about months more of litigation and the cost, if he 
fought against what they had done. 
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So, it was no surprise that Kosmann went against his attorney (7/26/17 Tr. P.8 L.21-23: 
“Probably didn’t do what he asked. But I’m doing this for my own accord because today is the 
day to move forward.”) and foolishly capitulated in putting the lesser settlement on the record, 
giving up $8,000 in exchange for literally nothing (Id., P.7 L.15-19: “Kosmann gave up $8,000 
for nothing. And it was all done in personal negotiations directly with Mr. Dinius without my 
involvement.”). A layperson taking actions that are detrimental to his interests, and contradicting 
his own attorney’s work and counsel, is exactly the type of damage that often results from a 
violation of Rule 4.2 and that the District Court is supposed to remedy. Instead, the District 
Court’s approach made a mockery of Rule 4.2, and its rulings indicated that attorney-parties can 
get away with ethical violations that benefit themselves.   
2. A District Court Does Not Have the Discretion to Reward an Ethical Violation 
and Ignore the Damage the Violation Caused to a Party in the Litigation. 
 In its two most recent rulings, the Court ruled that even if it found an ethics violation, it 
would not remedy the violation. In its November 22nd ruling, the Court said it would not remedy 
the violation because it lacked authority to enforce the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. (R. 
Vol. 2, pp. 170-71.) In its January 24, 2018 ruling, the District Court seemed to back off that 
ruling somewhat, but still indicated that it was not going to address the ethical violation because 
it believed that the Idaho State Bar should handle the issue. (R. Vol. 2, p. 193.) Both rulings are 
errors of law and/or an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.  
To the extent the District Court is still claiming it lacks authority to enforce the ethical 
rules, that is an error of law, as pointed out by all of the caselaw and policy arguments in the 
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Appellant Brief. (AOB, pp. 33-37.) To the extent the District Court is exercising its discretion to 
delegate the issue solely to the Idaho State Bar, that is an abuse of discretion, as a District Court 
cannot ignore a violation directly impacting the litigation, see, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 
147 Idaho 1, 11, 205 P.3d 650, 660 (2009) (“The magistrate judge, rather than exercising his 
discretion in the matter, delegated the resolution of the issue. The magistrate judge's refusal to 
act was an abuse of discretion ….”), and cannot use its judicial power to enforce the tainted 
reduced settlement and thereby help an attorney benefit from his/her ethical violations. See Boe, 
163 Idaho 922, 422 P.3d at 1140 (“cornerstone maxim of our justice system that a party cannot 
reap a profit by virtue of committing misconduct”). 
 This Court has repeatedly cited to Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991):   
[W]hen there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately 
sanctioned under the rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the rules rather than the 
inherent power. But in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statue nor the 
rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power.  
 
Talbot v. Ames Const., 127 Idaho 648, 651–53, 904 P.2d 560, 563–65 (1995) (quoting 
Chambers); State v. Rogers, 143 Idaho 320, 322–23, 144 P.3d 25, 27–28 (2006), as amended on 
denial of reh'g (Sept. 19, 2006) (“However, this Court has recognized that trial courts also have 
an ‘inherent authority to assess sanctions for bad faith conduct against all parties appearing 
before it.’”) (quoting Chambers). Unethical conduct by an attorney during a mediation must be 
sanctionable; Rule 11 has no application to actions during a mediation, so the inherent power to 
sanction bad faith conduct must apply.  
Other jurisdictions have consistently held that its courts have inherent power to enforce 
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the ethical rules. See, e.g., Matter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 488 (D.N.M. 1992) (“Certainly, if 
permitted to act unethically any attorney could gain advantage over his or her adversary. But to 
prevail in litigation by unfair means not only rewards the unscrupulous but relegates justice to a 
hollow victory. This is exactly what the codes of ethics is designed to prevent”); MMR/Wallace 
Power & Indus, Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 717—18 (D. Conn. 1991) (“Federal 
courts have inherent authority to discipline attorneys who appear before them for conduct 
deemed inconsistent with ethical standards imposed by the court”); Kleiner v. First Nat. Bank Of 
Atlanta, 102 F.R.D. 754, 773—75 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff‘d in part, vacated in part, 751 F.2d 1193 
(11th Cir. 1985) (“This Court has the inherent authority to impose monetary sanctions against 
attorneys for misconduct”); Vertical Res., Inc. v, Bramlett, 837 A.2d 1193, 1201—02 (Pa. 2003) 
(“Unquestionably, courts possess the inherent power to disqualify counsel for a Violation of 
ethical standards”). The District Court erred by ignoring all of this case law and logic. 
Dinius and the District Court point to Idaho statute and regulations that give the Idaho 
State Bar the authority to discipline attorneys for ethical violations. (R. Vol. 2, p. 193.) However, 
Kosmann did not ask the District Court to act against Dinius or Dunbar’s licenses. Kosmann 
asked the District Court to use its inherent powers to enforce the attorney ethical rules and 
remedy the damages that an attorney did to an opposing party in on-going litigation. Disciplinary 
proceedings are not an adequate or complete substitute. This basic concept is explicitly 
recognized in the very regulations cited by Dinius and the District Court: “Powers of Lower 
Courts. These Rules shall not be construed to deny to any court the powers necessary to 
maintain control over its proceedings.” Idaho Bar Commn. R. 500(b).  
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The District Court also seemed to argue that it decided not to impose sanctions for 
violation of the ethical rules because IRCP 11 was the more applicable approach:  
This Court determined that the motions for sanctions were most appropriately 
analyzed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11, and declined to exercise its discretion to rely 
exclusively on its inherent authority to sanction conduct that the Court determined did 
not violate Rule 11. 
 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 193.) Rule 11 has nothing to do with sanctioning and remedying the ethics 
violation that occurred during the mediation.6 Rule 11 is applicable to court filings, not to actions 
occurring during a mediation. It is error of law and abuse of discretion for the District Court to 
use the irrelevant Rule 11 as a reason to not enforce the ethical rules.  
The District Court’s two rulings must be reversed that refuse to remedy and/or impose 
sanctions for violations of IRPC 4.2 based on the incorrect and/or unexplained belief that the 
issue must or should instead be resolved by the Idaho State Bar. It is legal error to claim the 
District Court lacked authority or to claim that Rule 11 had some relevance to ethical violations 
during a mediation. It is an abuse of discretion for the District Court to claim it would not 
address the issue because of the irrelevant Rule 11 or because the Idaho State Bar could also 
pursue disciplinary proceedings. It is an abuse of discretion for the District Court to ignore, 
rather than address, all the case law and policy arguments raised by Kosmann. 
                                                 
6 In the Respondent’s Brief, Dinius repeatedly argues, incorrectly, that Kosmann was asking the 
District Court to sanction Dinius’s unethical actions during the mediation based on IRCP 11. 
Kosmann never asked the District Court to use Rule 11 to sanction violations of IRPC 4.2. It was 
the District Court that decided to evaluate the issue based on Rule 11. The Court’s rulings on that 
issue were irrelevant. Kosmann repeatedly asked the District Court to remedy the unethical 
conduct during the mediation pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority to enforce the ethical 
rules. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 337-41, 395-98, 493-96.)   
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3. Idaho Law Does Not Support the Rule 11 Sanctions Imposed on 
Kosmann/Messerly and Not Imposed on Dinius. 
 In its second and third rulings (following up on an initial oral ruling), the District Court 
claimed that Rule 11 sanctions would awarded against Kosmann for not initially filing a motion 
for leave when submitting a supplemental brief and declaration. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 173-74, 194-95.) 
Kosmann has provided numerous arguments for why that was both an error of law and an abuse 
of discretion. (AOB, Part I.C.3-8, Part III.E.) In the Respondent’s Brief, Dinius could not cite 
any Rule 11 law/case or even present a logical argument for why the District Court correctly 
applied Rule 11 (despite the fact that Dinius asked for those sanctions seven different times). 
 Even now, Dinius refuses to concede that he improperly requested sanctions against 
Kosmann/Messerly under Rule 11 without complying with the 21-day safe-harbor requirement. 
Dinius refuses to withdraw his sanction request and return the $200. Instead, in the Respondent’s 
Brief, Dinius claims that his violation of the 21-day safe harbor provision should be allowed 
because Messerly did not catch it soon enough below (not until the reply brief on the motion to 
reconsider).7 (RB, p.22, 35-36.). That argument is wrong for many reasons. 
First, Rule 11 puts the onus on Dinius to comply with the 21-day notice requirement (not 
on Kosmann to catch the violation). IRCP 11(c)(2) (“The motion must be served under Rule 5, 
but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper … is corrected within 
                                                 
7 Messerly did not catch it sooner for at least four reasons: (1) he is not familiar with the details 
of the Rule, having never filed a Rule 11 motion against another attorney nor had such a motion 
filed against himself; (2) he knew Dinius’s request was frivolous, so he spent as little time on it 
as possible; (3) using only common sense he was able to give the District Court numerous and 
sufficient reasons to reject the frivolous motion; (4) working without pay, Messerly has tried to 
reasonably minimize the time and research expense.  
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21 days after service….”) When Dinius sought Rule 11 sanctions, he was obligated as part of his 
prima facie case to provide proof that he complied with the 21-day safe-harbor requirement. The 
record shows Dinius never provided that prima facie showing (any of the seven times he 
requested sanctions), so he should never have qualified for sanctions. Second, Messerly 
repeatedly asserted in his briefs and declarations that he was unaware of his procedural mistake, 
was not been told by Dinius about the mistake prior to the sanctions request being filed, and 
fixed it immediately, two days after it was raised. (R. Vol. 3, pp.304, 316 ¶30.) Thus, Messerly 
raised the “notice and opportunity to correct” issue immediately, and thereby should have put 
both the Court and Dinius and Dunbar on notice regarding Rule 11’s safe-harbor requirement.  
Third, Dinius and Dunbar have only themselves to blame for not complying with the 
Rule’s requirements. Dinius and Dunbar violated the rule and now they improperly argue they 
should be allowed to violate the rule because they almost got away with it before Messerly 
figured it out (and because the District Court never figured it out or just did not care). Fourth, the 
issue was clearly raised in the reply brief, so Dinius and Dunbar could have challenged it below. 
(R. Vol. 3, pp. 506-07.) Instead, they choose not to contest it before the District Court because 
they cannot contest it. It is undisputed they did not comply with the 21-day requirement, though 
they have refused to admit it (they do not deny it and the record speaks for itself). 
Fifth, Kosmann’s arguments in the reply brief were a specific response to arguments that 
Dinius and Dunbar made in their opposition brief. Dinius and Dunbar argued, “Notable, 
Kosmann has failed to raise any argument or cite any case law to support his contention that an 
abuse of discretion occurred [with regard to the Rule 11 sanctions imposed].” (R. Vol. 3, p. 464.) 
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In the reply brief, Messerly responded directly to that argument and cited overwhelming law on 
numerous issues that showed the District Judge had improperly imposed sanctions. (Id., pp. 504-
07.) Dinius and Dunbar bluffed that there was no case law, and they cannot complain when they 
opened the door and Messerly called their bluff by properly responding in the reply brief to show 
their arguments were incorrect. Dinius and Dunbar have now had more than a year to come up 
with any law to support the validity of their seven Rule 11 sanction requests against Kosmann; 
they cannot provide anything. 
The only Rule 11 sanctions that should have been imposed in this case are sanctions 
against Dinius for bringing a Rule 11 sanctions request for improper purposes, i.e. retaliatory, to 
increase fees, etc. Dinius falsely claims that this issue was not raised below. Kosmann raised the 
issue immediately in his briefing, pointing out repeatedly that Dinius was abusing Rule 11, using 
it to retaliate and making frivolous arguments. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 303-305, 340, 498.) Then, in 
response to Dinius’s argument that there was no law to support Kosmann’s position, Kosmann 
cited to the advisory notes for Rule 11 and related caselaw:  
The advisory notes also point out that this misuse of Rule 11 motions could itself lead 
to sanctions: “As under former Rule 11, the filing of a motion for sanctions is itself 
subject to the requirement of the rule and can lead to sanctions. However, service of 
a cross motion under Rule 11 should rarely be needed since under the revision 
the court may award to the person who prevails on a motion under Rule 11—
whether the movant or the target of the motion— reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.” See, e.g., Smith v. 
Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014) (awarding sanctions 
against party bringing motion for sanctions based upon disputable issues and trivial 
issues and using it to argue on the merits and to be combative). 
R. Vol. 3, p.507 (emphasis added). Thus, the issue was raised below (the District Court just 
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ignored it) and the caselaw points out that a cross-motion for fees is unnecessary; fees should 
automatically be awarded when the evidence shows that Dinius was making frivolous and 
retaliatory sanction requests against Kosmann/Messerly. 
 The District Court did not even consider any of the law related to Rule 11. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 
173-74, 194-95.) Instead, the District Court’s rulings give only one reason for the sanction: 
Messerly made a procedural error. That is not sufficient reasoning to support Rule 11 sanctions 
(otherwise every attorney error would result in automatic sanctions and Dinius and Dunbar 
would have been sanctioned many times in this case) and that lack of a detailed analysis is an 
abuse of discretion. The District Court also ignored all of the reasoning offered by Messerly, 
who provided numerous reasons why such a sanction would be unheard of, unfair, and bad 
policy. It was abuse of discretion (not an “exercise of reason”) for the District Court to just 
ignore Kosmann’s arguments, suggesting that the District Court could not refute them and had a 
pre-determined result it wanted. 
4. The District Court Erred in Distorting Contract Law Principles and Ignoring 
Contrary Facts In Order to Whitewash Ethical Violations. 
 In its first and third rulings, the District Court ruled that the reduced settlement was 
enforceable pursuant to contract law principles. As argued in the Appellant’s Opening Brief, that 
ruling tries to ignore the ethical violation and should be reversed, for all the reasons stated above 
regarding the importance of Rule 4.2 and the Runsvold decision. (Supra, Part II.D.1) In addition, 
that ruling goes against the basic legal principle that courts will not assist parties in benefiting 
from their ethical violations. (AOB, pp. 3, 32.) 
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In the Appellant Brief, Kosmann also argued that (1) such a ruling is incorrect because 
the factual findings by the District Court (claiming that Kosmann somehow knowingly and 
voluntarily agreed, after receiving advice from counsel) improperly ignore all the contrary 
evidence in the record (AOB, pp. 24, 33), (2) such a ruling is incorrect because the Court should 
properly evaluate this case as an ethics law case, not a contract case, and should fully remedy the 
ethical violation that put Kosmann into the unfair predicament of putting a lower settlement on 
the record (AOB, p.37, noting that the contract law analysis should be “moot”), (3) even if the 
District Court wants to enforce the agreement put on the record, it still must use ethics law to 
remedy the damages to Kosmann and make him whole by reimbursing his $8,000 and attorney 
fees (AOB, p. 34; 11/8/17 Tr. P.40 L.18 to P.41 L.25), (4) such an interpretation of contract law 
would have disastrous policy implications in allowing an attorney to get away with violating the 
no-contact rule as long as the attorney is able to trick the opposing party into “voluntarily” 
putting the new agreement into writing or on the record (AOB, pp. 37-38), and (5) there are 
numerous contract defenses that could be applied, if necessary, in order to avoid the unfair result 
of an attorney directly benefiting from an obvious ethical violation (AOB, pp. 37, fn.3).  
As stated repeatedly in the Appellant Brief, the District Court issued rulings that blatantly 
ignored all the facts put in the record that showed it was not a voluntary decision by Kosmann in 
giving up $8,000 in exchange for a worthless release that his counsel said would not be accepted. 
(AOB, Part I.B.4-8; R. Vol. 3, 389-95.). The District Court is ignoring how Dinius’s ethical 
violation created a “Sophie’s Choice” or no-win situation for Kosmann, which is not a true 
voluntary decision. It was an error of law for the District Court to ignore all the facts in the 
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record that contest the voluntariness of the reduced settlement. See Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 
150 Idaho 664, 671–74, 249 P.3d 857, 864–67 (2011) (“Thus, we hold that the district court 
erred in granting what was in effect summary judgment … because Knudson raised genuine 
issues of material fact concerning the existence of both the Knudson–Vanderford Settlement and 
the Greifs–Vanderford Settlement in his affidavit.”); see also Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 
163 Idaho 841, 419 P.3d 1139, 1146 (2018) (reversing enforcement of settlement based on 
genuine issue of material fact).   
Even more important, the District Court improperly sought to resolve this case based 
upon contract law principles, rather than ethic law principles. Kosmann asked the District Court 
to resolve the case based upon ethics law principles, rather than trying to force it to fit into 
contract law principles. (R. Vol. 3, 221-30, 334-41, 395-98.) Neither Dinius nor the District 
Court ever cited even one contract law case addressing a factually similar scenario. Kosmann 
cited two cases where courts refused to enforce agreements that were tainted by ethical 
violations. See Mathews v. Bronger Masonry, Inc., No. 1:09-CV—00478-SEB, 2011 WL 
7334035, at *9—12 (SD. Ind. Dec. 29, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, N0. 1:09-
CV—00478-SEB, 2012 WL 515886 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 15, 2012); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 
P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994) (“We refuse to enforce an agreement in favor of an attorney who 
admittedly engaged in conduct which we consider to be unethical to obtain the agreement.”). 
Kosmann also cited to the similar fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and its logic in not allowing 
the bad actor to benefit from the fruits of their bad acts. Contract law does not easily apply to this 
scenario. Ethics law does easily apply, as pointed out by the various treatises and case law. See, 
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e.g., ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 420 (Ellen J. 
Bennett et al., 7th ed. 2011). It was legal error for the District Court to claim that contract law 
could resolve this case without ever addressing the ethic violation at the center of the dispute. 
Kosmann did not have space in the opening brief to address all of the contract defenses 
that might be applicable to this factual scenario. Instead, Kosmann listed numerous examples, 
like he listed numerous examples for the District Court. None of these contract principles are a 
simple or straightforward fit to the facts of this case because this is not a contract law dispute. 
Kosmann properly did not waste this Court’s time with pages of irrelevant contract law 
discussion. The District Court’s rulings that improperly try to apply contract law (and ignore all 
contrary, relevant facts) should be reversed. This issue should be resolved based upon IRPC 4.2, 
its application to the facts in this case, and logical equitable remedies for violations of IRPC 4.2.    
5. Striking the Memorandum and Declaration in Support of the Motion to 
Reconsider Was an Abuse of Discretion.     
 The District Court ruled that it would not consider the Memorandum and Declaration of 
Counsel filed in support of Kosmann’s Motion to Reconsider, finding that these filings were 
untimely. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 184-85.) However, the District Court did consider the motion to 
reconsider and supporting Kosmann Declaration, it did consider the reply brief in support of the 
motion, and it did issue a ruling. (Id. pp. 181-95.) The ruling did not state if there were any issues 
that went unconsidered because the initial memorandum was stricken or whether any key facts 
were left undisputed because the counsel declaration was stricken. (Id.) It is not clear if the 
Court’s ruling to strike the Memorandum and Declaration actually had any substantive impact. 
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However, in an abundance of caution, Kosmann also appealed the District Court’s decision to 
strike those two filings as an abuse of discretion.  
 The Motion to Reconsider stated that a supporting memorandum and declaration would 
be filed prior to the hearing, in compliance with IRCP 7. (R. Vol. 3, p.345.) Both were then 
timely filed more than fourteen days prior to the schedule hearing date for the motion. However 
Dinius and Dunbar argued that this Court had held that motions to reconsider under IRCP 59 
were different and briefs and declarations were supposed to be filed with the motion (it does not 
say that in IRCP 59(e)). Messerly did not dispute what the cases appeared to say and asked that 
the “untimely” filings be allowed because they were important, they were untimely because of 
reasonable confusion between IRCP 7 and 59, no one was harmed by the timing of the filings, 
procedure should not be elevated over substance, and a lesser remedy could be given that 
allowed Dinius and Dunbar additional time to respond.    
 As noted in Appellant’s Opening Brief, the District Court’s decision to strike the two 
filings was not based on some detailed reasoning. Instead, the only consideration of the District 
Court was that the attorney had admitted to misunderstanding the timing rules: filing the brief 
and declaration in compliance with IRCP 7 timing rules but apparently out-of-compliance with 
IRCP 59 timing rules. The District Court’s belief about a procedural error was its only 
consideration. It did not give any other reason for its decision to completely disregard an 
important memorandum and declaration.  
As this Court has stated many times, a court should not elevate procedure over substance. 
See, e.g., Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 121, 247 P.2d 469, 471 (1952) (“But, except as to those 
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which are mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations should not be so applied as to 
defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of causes upon their substantial merits 
without delay or prejudice.”); see also Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 
241, 247–48, 178 P.3d 606, 612–13 (2008) (“[T]his Court will construe the provisions of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure liberally in order to resolve cases on their merits instead of on 
technicalities.”); Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710, 711–13, 587 P.2d 1245, 1246–48 (1978). It is an 
abuse of discretion for a court to strike filings merely because of an alleged procedural error (if it 
even was an error, considering the plain language of IRCP 7 and 59, see AOB, p.41, fn. 5) and 
for no other stated reason. At a minimum, a court should find some prejudice to the opposing 
party or some significant aggravating circumstances.  
It was also an abuse of discretion for the court to use the heavy-handed sanction of 
striking filings rather than finding a less prejudicial approach. The Court had numerous ways to 
address a procedural mistake in a way that would not prejudice the substantive arguments in the 
case. For example, the District Court could have addressed any possible timing error by giving 
Dinius additional response time. Instead, the Court’s punishment did not fit the crime.  
It was also an abuse of discretion for the court to not even consider all of the arguments 
made by Kosmann about why not to strike the memorandum and declaration: that they contained 
important arguments, citations, and evidence to help the court avoid legal error, that they were 
filed in good faith within the timing rules of IRCP 7, that striking the filings based on an 
innocent and understandable misunderstanding of briefing deadlines would be elevating 
procedure over substance, and that the timing caused no prejudice to the opposing party (in fact 
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they were filed early to give the opposing party more than the normal seven days to respond to a 
motion). Kosmann made all of those arguments in the briefing, but the District Court did not 
even address them. It is not an “exercise of reason” to just ignore all contrary persuasive 
arguments. The District Court’s penchant for ignoring all arguments that it cannot refute with 
law or logic is indicative of a result-oriented approach that is an abuse of discretion. 
E. Kosmann Is Entitled to Recovery of Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
The main source for recovering appellate attorney fees should be IRPC 4.2 and this 
Court’s inherent power to award attorney fees as part of a sanction/remedy for a violation of an 
ethical rule. It appears to be black letter law that a Court should award attorney fees to reimburse 
a party that has to litigate to remedy an ethical violation. See, e.g., ABA ANNOTATED MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, p. 420 (Ellen J. Bennett et al., 7th ed. 2011) (“courts 
have ordered evidentiary remedies, return of documents, monetary sanctions, and even 
disqualifications.”); see also Hammond v. City of Junction City, Kan., 126 F. App'x 886, 888–90 
(10th Cir. 2005); Goswami v. DePaul Univ., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1015–19 (N.D. Ill. 2014); 
Parker v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009–14 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Larry 
James Oldsmobile-Pontiac-GMC Truck Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 175 F.R.D. 234, 246 (N.D. 
Miss. 1997); Faison v. Thornton, 863 F. Supp. 1204, 1221 (D. Nev. 1993) (awarding $45,600 in 
attorney fees incurred in proving that two attorneys violated Rule 4.2); Palmer v. Pioneer Inn 
Assocs., Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Nev. 2002); Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194, 200–08 
(Utah 2001). This is the law because logically, a party cannot fully protect itself against ethical 
violations if it cannot recover the cost of being forced to prove up the violation in litigation. 
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Appellate fees are a big part of that cost. 
Here, Dinius refused to do the simple remedy of his ethical violation, paying the full 
$40,000 settlement rather than the $32,000 amount. Instead, Dinius filed the motion seeking to 
force Kosmann to accept the $32,000 as the settlement amount. Kosmann was thus forced to 
litigate the ethical violation that he did not want to litigate. For more than a year, he has been 
forced to incur thousands of fees to litigate what is an obvious ethical violation. Dinius has raised 
every possible argument to justify the ethical violation and obtain the tainted fruit of that 
violation. Dinius has cut no corners in causing Kosmann to incur massive legal fees. Dinius has 
filed frivolous and retaliatory sanction requests to further run up Kosmann’s costs. Messerly did 
the work based on the case law and the logic that indicates those fees would eventually be 
reimbursed. If Idaho law does not reimburse those fees, as part of the sanction for the ethical 
violation, then ethical violations will go unpunished. Unethical attorneys would use the cost of 
litigation in order to avoid sanction.  
In fact, that is almost what happened here. Kosmann initially put the lesser settlement on 
the record, in part, because of his fear of the litigation cost of challenging the ethical violation: 
Dinius, Dunbar, and Judge Dunn told him (and Messerly could not disagree) that fighting it 
would cost him more money, more time in litigation, and would continue to tie up his $32,000 
held by the District Court. Kosmann only changed his mind, in part, because Messerly was 
willing to do all this work based on the belief (based on case law, general ethics and sanctions 
law, and common-sense equitable principles) that the fees would eventually be paid by the 
parties who violated the ethical rule, refused to fix it, and caused the parties to have to litigate it. 
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The Court also has other options for awarding appellate fees, pursuant to both statute and 
contract. The statute is I.C. § 12-121, and Kosmann has already fully described all of the 
frivolous arguments and positions that Dinius has taken in this litigation. (E.g., supra, Part II.A.)  
The contract is the written Settlement Agreement that Dinius sought to enforce in this 
case. That written Settlement Agreement that Dinius drafted is in the record; it seeks to make 
Kosmann agree that he would only receive a $32,000 settlement and it contains an attorney fee 
provision that applies if there is any litigation “concerning, relating to, or arising out of this” 
Settlement Agreement. Dinius filed a motion seeking to enforce that written Settlement 
Agreement, and he submitted the written Settlement Agreement to the District Court. (R. Vol. 3, 
p. 17: “the Defendants respectfully request that the Court enforce the settlement pursuant to the 
terms agreed to by the parties and as set forth in Version 4 of the Mutual Release and Settlement 
Agreement.”; pp. 23-24, ¶¶ 10-11; p. 54-59.) Clearly, this litigation has been “concerning, 
relating to, or arising out of this” Settlement Agreement, so the attorney fee provision in the 
Settlement Agreement applies. It is irrelevant that the written Settlement Agreement was never 
signed by the parties. This Court has previously held that by seeking to enforce a contract, Dinius 
was seeking to enforce all portions of the Agreement, including the attorney fee provision, so he 
cannot now complain that it would be operative upon him as written. See Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. 
v. Cty. of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 414–15, 258 P.3d 340, 349–50 (2011) (”Where a court holds 
a contract is unenforceable, the prevailing party may nonetheless be entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under the contract.”); O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909–12, 188 
P.3d 846, 851–54 (2008).  
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Thus, on remand, Kosmann asks this Court to instruct the District Court to award all 
reasonable fees incurred by Kosmann in proving up and remedying the ethical violation, 
including his appellate fees, pursuant to IRCP 54, I.C. § 12-121, Version 4 of the Mutual Release 
and Settlement Agreement contract, and pursuant to IRPC 4.2 and the courts’ inherent powers to 
enforce the ethical rules and its inherent sanctioning powers.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For all the reasons stated above and in the Appellants’ Opening Brief, Kosmann 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s three, key memorandum 
decisions, as to all aspects, and remand to a different district judge with instructions that: (1) 
confirm that Dinius violated IRPC 4.2 when, during formal mediation, he met alone with the 
opposing party without first obtaining consent from opposing counsel for that meeting, (2) the 
proper remedy is to void the renegotiated settlement, enforce the original agreement (thus, award 
the $8,000 in lost settlement funds), and reimburse all post-mediation attorney fees, including 
appellate attorney fees, incurred by Kosmann, and (3) unwind the Rule 11 monetary sanctions 
against Kosmann and Messerly and return their funds, with interest, and sanction Dinius and 
Dunbar for their abusive use of Rule 11 to harass and retaliate.  
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of October, 2018. 
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